The End of Everyone Else's Faith, Part I: Sam Harris and a Religion

Given the present silence that seems to have descended over Boggo Road Gaol, I shall shift topic to inaugurate what will be a four part analysis regarding the work of Sam Harris. After wading through his turgid but shallow The Moral Landscape (2010) I had all but decided not to deal with Harris’ difficult prose again. In the end though, I managed to read parts of The End of Faith (2004) and also the 66 pages of Free Will (2012). In this initial post I will be examining a matter from End of Faith.


Before proceeding it is necessary to make a point about critically discussing what Harris has written. Previously I noted the difficult prose which mars any meaningful contribution the texts may seek to make. As PZ Myers puts it, “one of the problems with grappling with the objectionable ideas Harris has thrown out is that they’re fuzzily presented and laced with caveats to hide behind” [1]. Given the amount of time Harris spends telling people that they (or others) are misrepresenting his views one wonders just how able he is to communicate a point [see: 2]. Not oblivious to that fact Harris even says, "I can’t shake the feeling that if I just wrote or spoke more clearly, this sort of thing wouldn’t happen" [2]. Indeed.


Such open awareness of his propensity for poor communication gives me cause to speculate. I suspect that accusations of misrepresentation may well be a built in retort which Harris deploys whenever he’s seen to be making statements that are of factually dubious or unsavoury character. Instances of such shall be considered when discussing Moral Landscape and Free Will in subsequent posts.


Additionally, when misunderstanding is claimed, something in the way of a genuine clarification should be forthcoming. Not something Harris does in the majority of cases. He appears instead to claim that the reader is mistaken and then proceed without anything resembling a more precise articulation. Again, that leads me to question whether his opaque deliveries, equivocation, and lack of clarity are deliberate.


So we have a problem when engaging with Harris’ work. One can avoid these though when focusing on basic points. Rather than addressing an aspect of End of Faith that could lead to claims of misrepresentation I shall herein focus on a contention so simple that even Sam Harris can communicate it clearly: that Buddhism is not a religion. My argument here is that Buddhism is a religion. In the following post I will argue in greater detail that it also serves as the basis of Harris’ own religiosity.


In a debate concerning the benefits or lack thereof from belief in God held earlier this year in Canberra, Lawrence Krauss said the following:


"Clearly, not every religious belief can be rational. It is generally true, from my experience in addressing audiences of people of faith, that that fact is accepted. But what is always accepted is that the other peoples' faiths are irrational and the peoples' own faith is rational." [3]


Such is the case with Harris. Despite having written a book titled The End of Faith and frequently criticising “religion”, Harris nevertheless possesses his own brand of religiosity against which he measures all others, asserting his own to be empirical and valid. To be absolutely clear: I am certainly not referring to ‘atheism’ as a religion, nor do I mean to suggest that science can be read as such; I mean to say Harris has beliefs derived from Buddhism that are not founded on evidence, and thus are faith-based beliefs linked to a recognised religion.


Of course, Harris’ counter is that Buddhism is not a religion. In the notes to End of Faith (another recurrent feature of Harris’ work is that significant points are buried in the endnotes rather than included in the main text), he writes:


“Attentive readers will have noticed that I have been very hard on religious faith – Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and even Hinduism – and have not said much that is derogatory of Buddhism. This is not an accident. While Buddhism has also been a source of ignorance and occasional violence, it is not a religion of faith, or a religion at all, in the Western sense.” (End of Faith, p.283)


Unhelpfully, Harris doesn’t establish what religion “in a Western sense” actually constitutes. Nowhere are we shown a difference between Western and (presumably) Eastern ‘religion’ nor why this should actually matter. I suspect a basic principle of distinction is being used by Harris, something along the lines of: ‘all these other examples have deities, Buddhism does not therefore it is not a religion’; or, ‘all these possess a supernatural dimension, (my) Buddhism does not therefore it is not religion’. In regards to the latter principle, AC Grayling has stated that Theravada Buddhism is not a religion but a philosophy because it has no supernatural "beings" [4]. Implied therein is the concession that not all Buddhism merits exclusion from the label ‘religion’. However, Harris remains general and sees all Buddhism as exempt.


Whether Buddhism is sufficiently akin to the Abrahamic traditions or Hinduism (it is in fact a derivative of it) is not the point. I could easily get into the range of academic definitions of ‘religion’ but instead will remain in the popular Harris-friendly sphere of discourse. Let’s consult the vernacular atheist’s bible – Wikipedia – for a definition: “Religion is a collection of belief systems, cultural systems, and world views that relate humanity to spirituality and, sometimes, to moral value” [5]. Notice also that supernaturalism is not required by this definition. Indeed, if we are to call Raelianism or Scientology religions then we need a definition that does not require the supernatural. After describing Buddhists as the physicists of spirituality, Harris proceeds to state:


“Though there is much in Buddhism that I do not pretend to understand – as well as much that seems deeply implausible – it would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge its preeminence [sic] as a system of spiritual instruction.” (End of Faith, p.284).


Without introducing any new phraseology we automatically see confluence: a “system of spiritual instruction” would by the definition be a religion. It warrants noting that the Wikipedia page includes Buddhism. Returning to the suggestion that Buddhism is not a religion in the “Western sense” it also warrants noting that Buddhism is part of the subject matter in Studies in Religion departments at major Western universities. Buddhist representatives also attend inter-faith chaplaincies and dialogues in at least this Western country.


If pushed Harris may say that he is 'spiritual' and not 'religious', a common reprise in this day. Presently though that is a way of being religious to one's own individualised faith rather than an institutional framework. In other words, spatiality and religion are different by degree, not kind. This is especially so given both rest on faith. Spirituality assumes a spiritual dimension without evidence. Once again, Harris offers no verification of the claim that Buddhism is preeminent. It is dishonest in any sense, including intellectually, to cast a system of belief as superior to all others (clearly Harris’ language extends the scope beyond religious systems) without at least providing a case first.


Thus, Harris is rebutted on a rather clear point. Whatever his, or other Buddhist proponents opinions, Buddhism is regarded as a religion and fits a broadly available definition of such that may quite easily enter the kind of public, non-academic discourse in which Harris resides.


In the next post I will further examine how Harris treats Buddhism to show that he has a certain faith-based (i.e. evidential unsubstantiated) conviction which undermines his general anti-religion stance.


[1] http://freethoughtblogs.com/pharyngula/2012/08/08/addressing-sam-harris/
[2] http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/wrestling-the-troll
[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YKrLab0IWg
[4] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfix_e1QnbM

To quote: "Theravada Buddhism is not a religion, it doesn't have any supernatural beings in it - it's a philosophy". However, there's no clear reason why a philosophy cannot equally become, or in some cases legitimately be called, a religion. Such certainly seems the case with the majority of Buddhism.

[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion

Religion News: Cult leader ordered to return cash

http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/8478161/cult-leader-ordered-to-return-cash

"In the South Australian District Court on Monday, Silvana Melchiorre was awarded a default judgment against the former Agape Ministries leader [Rocco Leo]  after he failed to appear."

If only the perpetrators of Christian apocalypse scams were ordered by law to return the money they've taken when Jesus fails to appear!

Evidence and the Absence Thereof

"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" has become one of the logicisms thrown around in debates over atheism. When confronted with William Lane Craig citing creationists (members of Operation 513included) one is likely to encounter the phrase as a retort, especially if the creationist in question has just been asked why there is so little evidence to back up their claims. The phrase isn't entirely without logic. If one position lacks evidence it does not automatically substantiate the contrary view. This can be demonstrated rather easily with a couple of examples.


Looking back to an earlier post, we see the Atheist Foundation of Australia claiming "there is no credible scientific or factually reliable evidence for [among other things] the supernatural." If pressed for a clarification of what makes something "factually reliable" I would wager the AFA would use 'science' or 'scientific' somewhere in their answer so really that's the same thing said twice. However, science is the study of nature. We would therefore not expect to find "scientific" evidence of the supernatural, because it is by definition beyond nature or outside of the natural world. As such, the absence of the evidence is not cause to doubt the supernatural (there are a lot of those besides science), and not an argument for or against it.

So what is a valid case where the absence of evidence acts against a claim? What we need is a case where we would expect there to be much more (and at least better) evidence if the claim were factually correct. One prime case is the existence of the Biblical Jesus. I say 'Biblical Jesus' to establish that whatever loose historical analogue may have actually been preaching and stirring social discord two thousand years ago, it was certainly not the figure known in the Bible. In fact, he wouldn't have even been called Jesus! That name is an anglicised version of the Greek version of the Hebrew that may have been someone's name but possibly not: (pronounced) Yeshua.

Back to the Bible and how its claims are undermined by absent evidence. The period when Jesus was, according to the Bible, performing his miraculous acts is covered by Roman historians, and other writers from around the time. Do any of them mention the events described in the Bible? No. Would we expect them to? Yes. Some of them wrote on very mundane topics and surely the events of the Bible would have warranted at least passing reference! The best that fundamentalists and Biblical literalists can offer are marginal references to a leader and a group that may have been an early form of Christianity. While these may be (I say may be because it is also possible the fragments were forged) clues to the historical Jesus they lend no credence to the Biblical narrative.

Here's a glaring example of how independent sources and the Bible clash: Josephus (Jewish but captured by the Romans) is one source cited to have mentioned Jesus. His extant work contains two references. It also contains an antipathy to Herod. Herod was the king who, according to the Bible, ordered the slaughter of all first born children when he heard a new kning was born. This secured him a place in the nativity story but despite the other negative material about Herod contained in Josephus's writing there is no mention of this act. That is evidence againts it being a historical event.

Playing Devil's advocate (on behalf of the Bible...) maybe we should consider the possibility that other references to Jesus have simply not survived. Would this be reasonable? No. Early Christian preserved certain texts because of their reference to Jesus and/or Christianity, that much is historical fact. From this we can deduce that material discussing Christianity would have been kept. However, we need to temper that statement because we also know that documents critical of Christianity (including denials of its truth value) are lost to us forever because they are not preserved, and in instances were actively destroyed, by Christians. How do we know of these texts then? Because Christian writers such as the Church Fathers (Augustine and Co.) quoted passages from them in order to criticise of rebuke the authors.

In sum, we can be reasonably certain that other material from close to the time of the Biblical Jesus mentioned Christianity but was not preserved and is therefore no longer extant. We can also be reasonably certain that any positive mention would have been kept for posterity. Given that the independent historical sources fail to substantiate the Biblical Jesus we have cause to doubt the Bible. Hence, we have found evidence of absence.

Speaking of Questionable Statements Made to the Public: Local Fundamentalists, Operation 513

For the first time in a very long time the Brisbane "Battle Log" has been updated by local Christian fundamentalist group, Operation 513. In case you've never heard of them (not many have, including the AFA before being told) Operation 513 are the organisation behind the preachers who appear in the Queens St Mall, opposite the entry to the Myer Centre every Saturday night from 9pm to midnight. Members are sometimes loose, sometimes random coalition of ardent Christians (including many a young Earth creationist).


Back in the day they used to post contrived accounts of their 'victories' in the name of God on a blog titled, the Battle Log - Log as in web log and Battle as in they see themselves as soldiers for Christ. Group leader (now of Canberra) and originator, Josh Williamson had something of a military fascination. But I digress...

My interest in the post actually has to do with one the flowing themes of the blog: atheism and agnosticism. In the post I found this little jab at another set of local preachers: "By this time, a bunch of guys from the Brisbane Atheists (really, agnostics) group had arrived and started debating with Blake [presumably the one preaching the Gospel at the time]." Heckling the preacher is a common activity (mostly undertaken by passing dunks), and a rather formal affair for the Brisbane Atheists. Last I heard a specific sub-group was being set-up to approach Operation 513 each and every Saturday (true what they say about some people having nothing better to do...).

With Operation 513 calling them agnostics I assume their arguments are on the weak side these days. Actually, I recall the sub-group's stating aim being something along the lines of 'putting a face on positive atheism'. Positive atheism involves the claim that one can disprove the existence of God. Negative atheism, on the other hand, simply claims that the arguments and evidence offered by theists does not provide conclusive or even satisfactory proof.

More questionable Statements from the Internet: Deconstructing a "definition" of Atheism

Sticking to the general topic of the peddling of questionable 'knowledge' (to update the local situation: Haunts of Brisbane is currently assembling a petition to request "Jack" Sim of Ghost Tours Pty Ltd turn over a document he purported to have in 2009 pertaining to the murder of Robert Cox) I thought I'd turn my attention to the "Atheist Foundation of Australia" and its various claims and assertions. Providing I have time, I will cover some of these in detail via subsequent posts. For the moment here's a basic breakdown of the problems which their "definition of atheism" suffers from:


As per the group's FAQ section (http://www.atheistfoundation.org.au/faq):

"Dictionaries contain a variety of definitions for Atheism. Prescribed by religious cultures has many Atheists finding them unsatisfactory. Most people who classify themselves as scientific Atheists consider the following definition to be a good working model:

Atheism is the acceptance that there is no credible scientific or factually reliable evidence for the existence of a god, gods or the supernatural."

Of course dictionaries include a variety of definitions. Dictionaries are supposed to catalogue the usage of words. If a word has multiple usages or possible meanings then those will (or at least should) be covered therein. The second sentence implies that the definitions that can be found in dictionaries are set or shaped by "religious cultures". Let's look at a couple of easily accessible dictionary definitions:

From 'Oxford Dictionaries' (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/atheism):

"noun
[mass noun]disbelief or lack of belief in the existence of God or gods."

From Meriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atheism):

"1 archaic : ungodliness, wickedness
 2 a : a disbelief in the existence of deity
    b : the doctrine that there is no deity"

I have restricted the search to a couple of results from the first page of Google simply because these are likely candidates that someone wanting a definition may come across before potentially stumbling onto the AFA site. Both are remarkably basic and leave little to be taken issue with. How then can these definitions be regarded as "unsatisfactory" (given dictionary accounts are typically quite simplistic, one therefore expects very little from them) or "Prescribed by religious cultures"? Both are presumably the result of dictionary researchers coming to agree that these represented broad but still useful accounts of the term.

The first is substantially broad yet quite correct. Although a historical case can be made that atheism pertains only to the denial of a theistic (as in, from theism, hence a-theism as a negation) God it is nevertheless applied presently to multiple conceptualisations of God and gods. Furthermore, "disbelief or lack of belief" accommodates both major stances with regard to atheism: positive (the assertion that God/gods do not exist), and negative (holding no belief in God/gods).

The second maintains similar features but adds further historicity to the definition. Noting the "archaic" usage identifies the use of the term in Ancient Greece as a synonym for impiety. While 2 a is far less clear than the Oxford account, it still provides a basic description of atheists as 'those who do not believe' in gods. 2 b is somewhat questionable, at least in my opinion as it implies a codification too similar to religion to adequately summarise the philosophical nature of atheism. However, do some groups or persons promulgate atheism in what may be described as a "doctrine"? Yes. I would argue that the AFA itself presents an example of this. Therefore the inclusion of that is appropriate.

Let's move on then to the third sentence of the AFA description. Suddenly we have a new sub-category: the "scientific" atheist. In my opinion "scientific" is being used here simply to provide validation through the tried and true invocation of science in that fashion. Moving on, we may ask why the group is so concerned with regular, dictionary accounts when they are "scientific" atheists. Indeed, one may also wonder if "Scientific Atheists Foundation of Australia" wouldn't have been a better moniker for the group to adopt. Regardless, on what grounds is the claim being made that the majority of such "scientific" atheists endorse the group's definition? Has a survey been carried out? Who are these "scientific" atheists and why are they so concerned with asserting a definition more elaborate than those we find in dictionaries? (Actually, why are they asserting a definition for atheism when they self-identify as "scientific" atheists?)

Now we come to the definition itself. Science makes a return when it is proposed that "no credible scientific or factually reliable evidence for the existence of a god, gods or the supernatural" exists. Firstly, the inclusion of "supernatural" takes us outside of atheism: in no way does the term imply or connote a denial of the supernatural, it deals specifically with deities. It is also worth pointing out that science proceeds using methodological naturalism and looks solely for natural causes. There could never be "scientific" evidence of the supernatural for precisely that reason. In the Dover schools trial, Intelligent Design was ruled unscientific (i.e. not able to be taught as science) because it involves supernatural agency.

Even more damning of this statement about errant evidence is the fact that a religious zealot could fully endorse it! Those who believe in God based on faith do not require evidence. Some of them even see the lack of conclusive evidence as proof that their faith is exactly that, faith. Evidence against their beliefs can also be seen as tests of faith. Perceiving a statement that may equally apply to the theist as to any atheist as even a “working definition” is what I would call naive.

Note the use of the word "acceptance" in the definition. Atheism is defined as "the acceptance" of no evidence for God or gods (I leave off the supernatural as it is patently spurious and is not part of atheism even in the most extreme generality). Before anything is said it is assumed that the position endorsed by the group is correct. One simply has to accept the state of affairs (...sounds rather like accepting Jesus as "our Lord and saviour"!).

Atheism is not "acceptance" it is, like any other position, a belief. I mean belief in the philosophical sense: a proposition taken to be true. It is obvious to me from the FAQ page and other parts of the AFA website that the author(s) of these sections do not know the difference between belief as a term within philosophy, and belief as a vernacular term. In the latter context belief usually implies a strong conviction (hence why a politician might say, "I believe..." rather than "I think...", as it appears to carry greater surety). Within philosophy there is no value judgement. The use of "acceptance" must then be the product of either: a) lack of knowledge, or b) misplaced semantics.

To sum up, the definition provided by the AFA website is, to my mind, an especially flawed one. Why bother pointing this out? Well, if a group purports to be a national body that represents a particular section of society then I argue there is an onus on them to actually know what they are talking about, just as there should be an onus on tour operators who cast their stories as anything but fiction to actually get the facts right. In my estimation and based on the above argumentation, the AFA falls substantially short of offering a useful, accurate, or even satisfactory definition. Far from being an exception, I have found other instances within that group's information and "articles" section displaying similar issues.

Much like I am concerned that those actually looking to become informed on Brisbane's history will be provided with errant information by a certain local tour operator, I am likewise worried that individuals who want to learn about serious intellectual concepts will be fed questionable definitions.

Huxley Quote

"[T]he question as to what Jesus really said and did is strictly a scientific problem, which is capable of solution by no onther methods than those practised by the historian and the literary critic."

T.H. Huxley, 'Agnosticism', 1889

Crawling down Anselm's Ontological Rabbithole

A long time favourite thrown up by the theists is Anselm's Ontological argument. Anselm lived between 1033 and 1109 so as usual, were dealing with the logic of a theologian who lived in century far different from our own. What's the point of making that observation? Well, the sort of argument and evidence he deploys is situated in a context where it probably made a lot more sense. Despite this they are drawn wholesale into a new cultural milieu with the expectation that they still hold a profound measure of validity.

Basic summary:

1- we can conceive of a greatest possible being (defined as omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect)
2- existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind
3- the greatest possible being must then exist otherwise it wouldn't be the greatest possible being
4- therefore, God exists

While Anselm admitted that we cannot know everything about God, he believed we can know enough to know that He is the greatest possible being and once we recognise this it would impossible to deny that being exists. Sounds rather like his position was, "until you believe in the God I believe in, you will continue to deny His existence." Presumably Anselm's belief in God prompted his formulation of the argument, and so it isn't the product of any actual attempt to prove God's existence per se; more accurately it could be described as a validation of existing convictions. Our old friend circular reasoning.

Returning to the claim that we can have sufficient knowledge of God to know He is the greatest possible being: this assertion ignores the possibility that what we know could lead to the opposite conclusion (i.e. God is flawed). Famously, a monk by the name of Gaunilo challenged Anselm in his own time by using the same structure to demonstrate the reality of non-existent things (his example was the 'perfect island'). While this deployment of Anselm's logic is supposedly mistaken as the object in question must be one with qualities that have an "intrinsic maximum".

But does the greatest possible being possess only attributes with an "intrinsic maximum"? For example, who defines the limits of 'moral perfection'? This is a good point to segue into the problem or evil which I'll visit in the next post, but for the moment it suffices to say that one man's omnipotence is another man's limitation:

To quote that profound modern day philosopher, Homer Simpson:

"Could Jesus microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?"

This is only part one of my continuing observation on the inherent flaws of the ontological argument. And even at this nascent stage the self-contradiction is eveident: if you already believe then this might look like convincing proof, but if you believe you don't need proof.

A being that exists may be better than one who doesn't; however, an argument that offers actual proof is infinetly greater than one that just claims to.